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Municipal Infrastructure Funding Deficit in Ontario?
Abstract
In Canada, it is estimated that the total value of core municipal infrastructure is over $1.1 trillion dollars
or about $80,000 per household. Of this value one-third is in poor or very poor condition which
increases the risk of service disruption. Municipalities are struggling to fund these infrastructure
renewal needs with limited revenue tools. Property taxes remain the largest source of revenue for
Canadian municipalities but are currently insufficient to meet their long-term needs.

Municipalities in Ontario have been advocating for additional revenue tools to address this challenge.
This paper uses a common set of evaluation criteria to analyze three potential revenue options to assist
Ontario municipalities in funding their long-term infrastructure needs. These include a 1% increase to
the provincial portion of the HST, the uploading of the education tax to create local property tax room,
and the sharing of cannabis excise tax revenues with municipalities. The results of this analysis are
compared to determine which of the proposed funding tools would best meet the needs of
municipalities in addressing the infrastructure funding challenge.
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Introduction
Municipal infrastructure is a fundamental requirement for virtually every part of a citizen’s life in
Canada. Among other things it:
•

Enables the movement of people and goods,

•

Maintains our health by providing clean drinking water, removal of waste and opportunities for
recreation;

•

Provides safety from flooding and other natural disasters.

In Canada it is estimated that the total value of core municipal infrastructure is over $1.1 trillion dollars
or about $80,000 per household. Of this value, one-third is in poor or very poor condition which
increases the risk of service disruption. (Canadian Infrastructure Report Card, 2016) In fact, there are
enough roads in Canada that are in poor condition to build a road almost halfway to the moon and one
third of recreational or cultural facilities require investment in the next decade. Climate change puts an
additional strain on aging infrastructure systems particularly those related to water, waste water and
stormwater systems. (Canadian Infrastructure Report Card, 2019)

Local governments across Canada are facing significant infrastructure funding deficits. Without
substantial increases in reinvestment rates, asset conditions will continue to decline resulting in more
costly repair treatments and higher risk of asset failure. (Canadian Infrastructure Report Card, 2016)
Canada’s mounting urban infrastructure debt is evidence that the current revenue tools available to
local governments are inadequate. Canadian local governments exist within a highly regulated
framework that restricts them from the use of many innovative tools. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools for
new times: a sourcebook for the financing, funding and delivery of urban infrastructure, 2006)
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The municipalities in Ontario have similar challenges to those of the rest of the country. The current
Municipal Act, 2001 restricts the types of revenue that can be generated by Ontario municipalities. As a
result, they rely heavily on property taxation to cover the cost of providing municipal services and
investment in infrastructure renewal. Of every dollar of household taxation paid in Ontario,
municipalities collect just nine cents (Johal & Alwani, 2019) yet are responsible for over 60% of Canada’s
public infrastructure. (Hamm, 2018) Unlike their counterparts in the United States, opportunities to
generate revenues from other sources such as local sales taxations are limited. However, a new Federal
and Provincial revenue source has recently become available that could potentially be shared with
municipalities to help them address this need.

The production and sale of recreational cannabis was legalized in Canada on October 17, 2018. Along
with this legalization, the Federal and Provincial Governments began to impose taxation on its sale. This
represents a new source of revenue to the Federal and Provincial Governments but also results in
increased costs, particularly at the municipal level for services such as licensing and enforcement.

The Goal of this Research
The aim of this paper is to investigate if the new taxation revenue generated from the legalization of
cannabis in Canada presents a viable funding tool to address the municipal infrastructure challenge.
This potential funding tool will be evaluated across a number of criteria by exploring a series of subquestions.

These include:
•

Is the tax fair in terms of the benefits received? Is there a strong link between the need for the
taxation and the use of the funding?

•

How immobile is the tax base?

3
•

Are the revenues sustainable, predictable and sufficient to meet the need?

•

Are the taxes visible, transparent and accountable?

•

Is there an ease of administration in passing this taxation revenue on to municipalities?

These evaluation criteria are not unique. Similar criteria have been employed in the past by other
researchers to evaluate a number of proposed alternative funding mechanisms. In this way, the results
of this research can be readily compared against past proposals to arrive at an appropriate
recommendation.

This inductive research aims to review the current infrastructure challenge facing municipalities in
Ontario and compare 3 potential funding tool options to address the need:
•

Option 1 - a partial distribution of the new excise tax revenues generated from the legalization
of cannabis to municipalities;

•

Option 2 - a 1% increase to the provincial portion of the HST; and

•

Option 3 - upload the education property tax to create local property tax room.

By comparing these three proposed tools, this research aims to answer the question:

“Which of the three proposed revenue tools is best suited to address the municipal infrastructure
funding deficit in Ontario?”

This research is focused on the Ontario context as sales tax rates and the funding of education from
property taxes varies across the different provinces and territories within Canada. As such, the
evaluation may not be applicable within other jurisdictions. Where appropriate, current practices from
the United States have been included to demonstrate opportunities to enhance infrastructure funding in
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local governments that have greater funding options available to them including local sales taxes and
other revenue sharing tools.

While all three revenue tool options will be evaluated, greater background and trend forecasting will be
provided for the recreational Cannabis tax sharing option. The rationale being that as this relatively new
source of taxation revenue in Canada, it has not benefited from the same volume of previous academic
literature as it relates to potentials for municipal funding as the other two options presented.

Understanding the Infrastructure Challenge
Municipal infrastructure is a “key driver of productivity and growth in a modern economy, as a
contributor to the health and well-being of Canadian citizens, and as a critical component of
transporting goods and services across the country.” (Brodhead, Darling, & Mullin, 2014)

Literature suggests a number of contributing factors to the infrastructure funding deficit. Many of the
major causes will be explored in the following sections including:
•

Aging infrastructure

•

Urbanization and Urban Sprawl Development

•

Overinvestment in Assets

•

Reductions in Senior Government Infrastructure Investments and Grant Programs

•

Downloading

•

Changing Infrastructure Standards and Increased Levels of Service

•

Failures in long-term planning

•

Interest Arbitration
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Aging Infrastructure
The majority of Canadian public infrastructure was built between the Second World War and the late
1970s as municipalities experienced a period of rapid growth and urbanization. This means that a large
amount of infrastructure has reached the end of its useful life. Canadian municipalities have entered a
wide scale rebuilding phase but lack the financial resources to do so. It is estimated that almost 30% of
Canadian infrastructure is over 80 years old while only 40% is under 40. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools for
new times: a sourcebook for the financing, funding and delivery of urban infrastructure, 2006) This
older infrastructure is more costly to maintain and underinvestment in ongoing maintenance often
results in much higher renewal costs.

Urbanization and Urban Sprawl Development
The bulk of the infrastructure existing in Canadian cities today was initially constructed by developers
during the urbanization of Canada in the 1950s and 1960s. As sprawling subdivisions were assumed by
municipalities this new infrastructure came without initial cost. Rather than setting aside the
assessment growth revenues from the new development for the future renewal of these assets,
municipalities instead invested in providing additional soft services to residents and kept property tax
increases artificially low.

Beginning in the mid 1940s, the rural edges of metropolitan areas in North America began to develop
into residential subdivisions and commercial strip developments. This urban sprawl development was
characterized by “vast tracts of low-density, often isolated, 1-2 floor single-family homes” (Donnan,
2008) Initially municipalities welcomed this form of development as it brought with it increased
employment and additional property taxes. However, this style of development is inefficient from a
public sector service delivery perspective. Single-family homes on large lots result in low population
densities which can not adequately support the cost of infrastructure and service such as transportation,
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water, sewer, waste management, police, fire and recreation without significantly high property taxes
when compared to compact urban development.

Some of the problems with urban sprawl Donnan identified include “inefficiencies due to high costs of
providing utilities, roads, highways and infrastructure to scattered, low density subdivisions and
bedroom communities” as well as “generation of “fiscal deficits” and rapidly increasing taxes for
jurisdictions where infrastructure capital and servicing operating costs exceed the development charges
paid by developers and additional tax revenues paid by property owners” (Donnan, 2008)

Overinvestment in Assets
Large scale senior government grant programs have sometimes resulted in municipalities taking on
additional infrastructure above what they would normally require or provide on their own. Grant
funded infrastructure such as recreation centres have been built in communities who do not have the
sufficient tax base to efficiently support the ongoing operating and maintenance costs nor have the
resources to reserve funding towards the long-term renewal of the facility. A full life-cycle cost analysis
including future operating and maintenance costs have rarely been considered when municipalities are
competing for limited grant funding. (Kitchen H. M., 2006) While municipalities have had to increase
taxes to cover the ongoing operating costs of these facilities they often fail to set aside funding for
future capital renewal and replacement.

Additionally, grant funding can lead to situations where user fees are set artificially low and do not fully
offset the true lifecycle cost of the supporting infrastructure. As an example, when senior government
grants provide funding to expand water treatment facilities, water rates may be set too low to recognize
the true cost of providing the service. This leads to inefficient cost management of the resource. “All
too often, inefficiently set user fees have led to overinvestment and larger facilities than would be
justified if more efficient pricing practices were adopted.” (Tassonyi & Conger, 2015)
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Reductions in Senior Government Infrastructure Investments and Grant
Programs
In addition to the overinvestment in assets that can occur with senior government grants, there can also
become an overreliance on the funding itself. Following the economic recession of the early 1980s, the
Federal and Provincial Governments began a period of fiscal restraint through the late 1980s and early
1990s. Capital grants that were previously available to fund major municipal infrastructure needs were
significantly scaled back. Total government spending on fixed capital formation measured as a
percentage of GDP peaked in the mid-1960s at almost 5% but fell steadily to 2.1% by the late-1990s.
While investment has increased since 2000 it has yet to reach historical levels. (Vander Ploeg C. G.,
2011) During this time municipalities had to become more reliant on their own sources of revenues to
address infrastructure needs. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools for new times: a sourcebook for the
financing, funding and delivery of urban infrastructure, 2006)

Downloading
The fiscal restraint programs by the Federal and Provincial governments of the late 1980s and early
1990s also led to the downloading of hard infrastructure as well as many programs to the municipal
level. This downloading can be especially challenging for rural and Northern Ontario communities with
high levels of infrastructure and social program costs but relatively small property tax bases. As an
example, the City of Kenora received a total of 18 downloaded bridges, 11 of which required immediate
maintenance or replacement in excess of $20 million. This placed an impossible financial burden on a
community of 15,000 residents with an operating budget of just $25 million if funding was to be
generated from the property tax alone. (Northwest Ontario Municipal Association, 2012)

In additional to hard infrastructure, Ontario municipalities are partly responsible for provincial welfare
programs and spend a large portion of their annual expenditures on social services such as social
assistance, childcare, social housing and homelessness initiatives. (Mintz & Roberts, 2006) These
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programs compete with property tax funding for infrastructure initiatives. This downloading of services
to the local level has stretched resources too thin as municipalities have not been provided new sources
of revenues to cover the additional costs. (Duffy, Royer, & Beresford, 2014)

Changing Infrastructure Standards and Increased Levels of Service
Standards and regulations for infrastructure and municipal services have changed significantly over
time, particularly as they relate to health and safety and the environment. (Vander Ploeg C. , New Tools
for new times: a sourcebook for the financing, funding and delivery of urban infrastructure, 2006) These
changes include legislation changes such as updates to the Building Code and requirements for AODA
compliance, as well as a desire for municipalities to demonstrate environmental leadership by
constructing new infrastructure to meet environmental standards such as LEED (Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design). As a result, infrastructure is not being replaced on a like-for-like basis as it is
renewed. Instead, higher quality materials are used and infrastructure is expanded to provide additional
capacity, as well as, higher service levels. This significantly increases renewal costs.

Failures in Long-Term Planning
In some municipalities long-term financial planning has taken a backseat to short-term projects or
election promises to keep property taxes artificially low. This can result in politicians supporting
projects whose time horizons coincide with their terms in office rather than taking a long-term view of
the municipal needs and fiscal realities of future generations. (Kitchen H. M., 2006)

Interest Arbitration
Interest arbitration in policing and fire service has increased the cost to deliver municipal services well
beyond the rate of inflation and has led to higher property tax increases. This competes with
investments in infrastructure renewal. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) suggests this
is the result of arbitrators who replicate contract negotiations from one fire or police service to another
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rather than looking at the municipal capacity to pay. They determined that if fire and police had
received the same increase as other municipal unions did between 2010 and 2014 it would have meant
$485 million in savings to Ontario municipal governments. This is the equivalent value of building
roughly 1,750 kilometers of road which is the distance from Windsor to Montreal and back. This value is
more than four times that of the 2016 Ontario Community Infrastructure Fund. (Association of
Municipalities of Ontario, 2017)

Understanding the Funding Challenge
Municipalities continue to take on ever increasing responsibilities with limited revenue generation
options. In 2015, AMO studied the fiscal situation faced by local governments in Ontario. They
concluded that municipalities are currently facing an estimated annual $4.9 billion shortfall each year for
the next 10 years. This estimated shortfall only accounts for the costs to maintain current service levels
and finance infrastructure renewal and does not factor in any service level increases, additional new
infrastructure or additional services downloaded from senior levels of government. Should property
taxes continue to be municipalities’ primary source of revenues, these would need to double by 2025.
This would represent an 8.35% annual increase for the next decade. Of this value 3.84% (46% or $2.25
billion) would be required for infrastructure renewal alone. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario,
2015) With these levels of required tax increases, attempting to close the infrastructure funding gap
with increases to the property tax alone is both unrealistic and unsustainable.

A key downfall of property tax is that its real per capita growth is well below the growth in other types
of revenues which can be generated at the Federal and Provincial levels such as those tied to personal
income and GDP. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) For example, between 1961 and 2007 local taxes grew an
average of 1.7% annually when adjusted for population and inflation while provincial personal income
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tax averaged 10.2% annual growth in real per capita terms over the same period. (Vander Ploeg C. ,
Problematic property tax: why the property tax fails to measure up and what to do about it, 2008)

Additionally, municipalities have taken on a number of non-traditional social service functions such as
public health initiatives and immigration assistance or have strong income redistribution functions such
as poverty mitigation and affordable housing. These newer types of municipal functions are ill-suited to
be funded from property taxes as the tax base is too narrow and they compete for funding allocations
against infrastructure investment. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)

Lobbying for Funding Solutions
The Municipal Act, 2001 restricts the sources of revenues available to municipalities in Ontario.
Property tax remains the single largest source of revenues to deliver municipal services and fund
expanded and renewed infrastructure. In other jurisdictions such as the United States, many local
governments have the ability to impose local sales and income taxes. Organizations such as AMO and
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) have studied the infrastructure challenge facing
municipalities and have lobbied provincial and federal governments for additional support. To date AMO
has considered over 40 revenue options and assessed them against similar criteria to that used in this
research. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2017) Some of these options include increased user
fees, cost sharing of services, public private partnerships, local income taxes, an infrastructure bank and
increased debt. Of all of these options studied, AMO has concluded that a 1% increase to the provincial
portion of the HST is their preferred recommendation.

Previous Academic Research in this Area
Countless articles have been written in the past 30 years which explore the infrastructure funding deficit
and propose various financing tools to address the issue. Of note are three papers outlined below which
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evaluate the property tax against other sources of municipal funding yet draw differing conclusions on
the effectiveness of property taxation.

In her article “Municipal financing of capital infrastructure in North America”, Enid Slack evaluated a
number of funding tools including property taxes, user fees, development charges, senior government
grants, debt, tax increment financing and public-private partnerships. (Slack, 2005) Among her many
findings she concluded that property tax is a good tax for local governments but that cities would
benefit from having a greater mix of taxation options.

The notion that municipalities require additional types of funding mechanisms was challenged by Bev
Dahlby and Melville McMillian in their paper "Do Local Governments Need Alternative Sources of Tax
Revenue? An Assessment of the Options for Alberta Cities." Using a similar research methodology to the
work of Slack, the authors challenged the more widely accepted conclusion within the field of study that
municipalities do require alternative funding sources if they are to generate sufficient revenues to meet
their infrastructure funding challenges. They assessed the appropriateness of property tax by examining
and attempting to discredit, via data analysis, the arguments made by other researchers including:
•

That property tax is unresponsive to economic growth

•

That property tax is an inadequate source of municipal tax revenue

•

That the property tax burden is regressive

•

The property taxes inhibit economic growth and development

The authors concluded that municipalities do not need alternative revenue sources but do recommend
that provinces begin funding education costs from general revenues to leave the extra tax room for
municipalities to use. (Dahlby & McMillan, 2014) This challenges many of the conclusions drawn more
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extensively within the research field which recommend the adoption of local or provincial sales taxes
dedicated to infrastructure funding.

Following the work of Dahlby and McMillian, Enid Slack worked alongside Harry Kitchen to publish their
paper “New Tax Sources for Canada’s Largest Cities: What Are the Options?”. In it they used a positivist
research ontology approach and quantitative analysis to estimate and evaluate various types of taxation
revenues for eight selected Canadian cities and compare those results against property taxation.

These researchers were testing the hypothesis that property taxation was a better revenue tool than the
other types of taxation evaluated. Their primary research question was “are some tax sources better
than others for cities? How do we decide?” (Kitchen & Slack, 2016) After evaluating a number of
taxation options for local governments they again concluded that a mix of tax options would be best. A
portfolio of taxes would allow cities to achieve revenue growth and revenue stability while ensuring
fairness in the impact on taxpayers. (Kitchen & Slack, 2016)

As research in this area has not yet landed on a definitive conclusion this demonstrates that further
study of the topic is warranted.

Evaluating the Proposed Revenue Sources
In order to evaluate the different proposed funding tools, it is important to establish a common set of
evaluation criteria. In the past 30 years, numerous researchers including Slack, Kitchen, Vander Ploeg,
Dahlby and McMillian have evaluated a significant number of proposed infrastructure funding solutions.
From this work a number of common evaluation criteria have emerged which include:
•

Fairness – There is perceived equity in terms of the taxes paid by the residents and businesses in
comparison to the benefits they received from local public services. All types of taxation are
value propositions in that if taxpayers perceive good value for the taxes they pay they have less
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incentive to change their behaviour to avoid the tax. (Vander Ploeg C. , Problematic property
tax: why the property tax fails to measure up and what to do about it, 2008)
•

Immobile tax base– If the tax base is unable to easily relocate then the tax will be borne by the
local residents and businesses and not passed on to people living in other jurisdictions.

•

Sufficient, stable, and predictable revenues – the revenue generated for the local government
can be reasonably counted upon. The total dollars generated are sufficient to meet the
identified gap or need. For the purposes of this analysis the $2.25 billion annual infrastructure
funding shortfall estimated by AMO will be used as the benchmark to determine if revenues are
sufficient. An annual value of $4.9 billion would be required to maintain current service levels
and fund infrastructure needs.

•

Visible, transparent, and accountable – the tax is understood by residents so they can hold the
government accountable. Taxpayers are more likely to support a tax used for a purpose they
value rather than paying a tax that disappears into the “black hole” of a general operating fund.
(Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)

•

Ease of administration – the tax is easy to administer and compliance costs are minimized.

In the following sections, Cannabis taxation revenues will be evaluated against a proposed 1% sales tax
and the uploading of education taxes to provide additional local property taxation room using these
same criteria. In this way the results can be readily compared and contrasted against other revenue
tools thereby leveraging the work done previously by other researchers in this field of study.

An outline of each of the proposed funding tools will be presented. The funding tool will then be
evaluated against the common set of evaluation criteria. Finally, the results of each evaluation will be
compared to make recommendations.

14

A New Opportunity – Cannabis Taxation
On October 17, 2018, the production and sale of recreational cannabis was legalized in Canada. As part
of legalizing this trade, both the Federal and Provincial Governments began to impose taxation in the
form of sales and excise taxes. These taxes represent a new source of revenue at both the federal and
provincial levels. Municipalities also gained the ability to generate a modest revenue increase in areas
such as business licensing. However, with legalization, the municipal level faced increased costs for
licensing and enforcement.

Current Taxation Framework
As part of the 2018 Federal budget, it was recognized that the cannabis excise tax would be shared on a
75/25 basis with 75% of the duties being provided to provincial and territorial governments while the
remaining 25% would remain with the Federal Government. It was also agreed that the maximum
annual funding taken by the Federal Government would not exceed $100 million with the excess being
paid to the provinces and territories (Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 2019). The
Coordinated Cannabis Taxation Agreements between the Federal and Provincial / Territorial
governments are in place for 2 years and will be reviewed in 2020. (Hartmann, 2018) The agreement by
the Federal Government to share a higher portion of excise tax revenues with the provinces and
territories was premised on the basis that a significant portion of their share would be further
distributed to local municipalities who bear the majority of costs related to legalization and
enforcement. (Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 2019)

These agreements also specified that the combined rate of all federal, provincial and territorial
cannabis-specific duties and taxes would not exceed the higher of $1 per gram, or 10% of a producer’s
selling price. (Mancell, 2018) The cannabis excise tax is a sin tax similar to that on tobacco, alcohol and
gambling. Whereas most sin taxes are used to discourage consumption by increasing the price of the
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final product, the capping of the duties and taxes was aimed at keeping the final price of legal cannabis
competitive with the illegal market.

In addition to the excise tax, recreational cannabis is subject to GST/HST/Provincial Sales Taxes where
applicable. The excise duties are included in the price on which the GST/HST/Provincial Sales Tax is
calculated on the sale of the final product to consumers. Manitoba imposes a mark-up on recreational
cannabis but not PST while British Columbia imposes a mark-up and PST. In addition, Health Canada
extracts cost recovery fees from cannabis producers. (Mancell, 2018)

All provinces and territories (with the exception of Manitoba which levies its own provincial tariffs)
receive the basic provincial duty. Some jurisdictions have further negotiated an adjustment to their
portion of the duties to offset varying sales tax rates across the country in the form of a supplemental
duty rate. These provinces/territories receive the basic provincial duty plus the supplementary duty rate
as follows:
•

Ontario: +3.9% of the base or dutiable amount;

•

Alberta: +16.8% of the base or dutiable amount;

•

Saskatchewan: +6.45% of the base or dutiable amount;

•

Nunavut: +19.3% of the base or dutiable amount.

New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador have included the
supplementary duty rate in their agreements but have currently set them to 0%. (Mancell, 2018)

Temporary Revenues Sharing with Municipalities
Each province is unique in how they regulate the industry and share taxation revenues if at all with the
local level. Currently only three provinces have executed short-term (2 year) funding agreements with
their municipalities. In Ontario, the provincial government agreed to provide $40 million of the new
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revenue to municipalities over 2 years to assist them with “cannabis legalization implementation in their
communities and ensure that municipal budgets are not unduly pressured by these activities”.
(Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2019) Quebec took a similar approach whereby municipalities
received $60 million over two years to cover new costs. (Hamm, 2018) In Alberta, the Municipal
Cannabis Transition Program (MCTP) provided $11.2 million over two years to municipalities to assist
municipalities with the challenges of legalization. This grant was only available to municipalities with
populations in excess of 5,000 and who were responsible for their own policing. In all three provinces
there has been no commitment to date for a long-term funding plan. (CBC, 2018)

Revenue Trends and Forecasts
To date cannabis revenues have fallen short of projections. In the first year of legalization (2018/19) the
federal government received just $18 million in cannabis revenues after originally projecting to earn $35
million. For the 2019/20 fiscal year, the government initially projected $100 million in revenues but has
since amended this forecast to $66 million. (Tumilty, 2020)

There are a number of factors which have resulted in revenues falling short of projections including
delayed physical retail locations and supply chain issues.

Ontario, which has the largest market for cannabis, was slow to open retail stores. The first retail
locations opened in April of 2019 with just 25 stores across the province. In June 2020, Ontario
authorized its 100th retail location. This is far below the 483 locations in Alberta (Lamers, Ontario
cannabis market surpasses 100 retail store authorizations, 2020) and suggests there is sufficient room in
the Ontario market to significantly expand the number of physical locations.

Prior to the opening of physical locations, Ontario customers could only purchase legal cannabis online
from the provincially run Ontario Cannabis Store (OCS). Statistics Canada found that retail sales in
Ontario rose quickly following the opening of physical stores. Similar experiences have occurred in
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other provinces. In New Brunswick, nearly 97% of sales take place in the province’s 20 physical locations
rather than online. (Marijuana Business Daily, 2020)

Supply issues have challenged other provinces. Initially in Alberta and Quebec stores had to limit
opening days because of supply shortages. (Tumilty, 2020) This in turn drove consumers back to the
illegal market.

Cannabis revenues are forecasted to grow to $135 million in 2020/21 and steadily increase to $220
million by 2023. (Tumilty, 2020) These values represent only the federal taxes and do not include
provincial revenues.

Expanding the market with Cannabis 2.0 products such as such as edibles, extracts and topicals will
further boost taxation revenues. These products became legally available for sale in Ontario in January
2020. In the first month, the Ontario Cannabis Store generated $4.3 million in sales from these products
with $3.77 million from the sale of vape products and $569,000 from the sale of edibles. (Subramaniam,
2020)

Market Trends and Forecasts
Cannabis is one of the most widely used substances in Canada with almost half of Canadians reporting
having used it at some point in their lives. The National Cannabis Survey found that 16.8% of Canadians
over the age of 15 reported using cannabis in the three months before being surveyed. Of these 6%
reported using cannabis daily or almost daily. (Rotermann, 2020)

As of June, 2020, there were 962 retail locations across Canada. This was an increase of 672 stores from
the prior year. (Cannabis Benchmarks, 2020) While the legal Canadian industry may have been slow to
take off following legalization, it is growing and will continue to expand as new Cannabis 2.0 products
reach the market.
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The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Cannabis Sales
Retail sales of cannabis in Canada fell just 0.6% from a record high of $181.1 million in March to $180.1
million in April despite a non-cannabis retail sales decline of 26.4% for the same time period. Sales
figures varied considerably across the country. In Ontario where physical locations were forced to
temporarily close as a result of the emergency orders, sales fell 9.6% and remained down during the
period of time when online ordering and curbside pickup was allowed. Once physical locations were
able to reopen, sales rebounded in May. (Israel, 2020) By contrast, in Alberta where stores continued to
be open, sales remained steady following an initial boost in March as customers horded cannabis. These
results support the evidence that cannabis sales are highly corelated to the availability of physical retail
locations.

Retail Pricing, the Impact of Taxation, and Addressing the Black Market
In June 2020, the Canada Cannabis Spot Index price including excise taxes was $6.40 per gram.
(Cannabis Benchmarks, 2020) The Ontario Cannabis Store (OCS) has found that 81% of the province’s
cannabis supply continues to originate from illegal sources. They attribute this problem to a continued
lack of retail locations and the higher dry flower prices in the legal system. From April 2019 to March
2020 OCS found that legal dry flowers sold in retail locations were 27% more expensive than those from
illegal sellers. However, pricing from the OCS online store was just 4% above the illegal prices. (Cannabis
Benchmarks, 2020) Similar examples of competition with the black market can be found across the
country.

In the Northwest Territories, legal cannabis products can currently be purchased online from the
Northwest Territories Liquor and Cannabis Commission (NTLCC) or from 5 liquor stores distributed
across the Territory. Retail prices there are some of the highest in Canada with average prices at $10.65
per gram. (Cannabis Benchmarks, 2020) As a result, in July 2020, the NTLCC reduced the price of legal

19
cannabis products by 10% in an effort to compete against illegal cannabis sales. (Marijuana Business
Daily, 2020)

In New Brunswick, the provincial cannabis retailer Cannabis NB, has also attempted to keep legal retail
prices competitive with the illegal market. They have renegotiated purchase contracts with suppliers
which were then passed on to customers in the form of lower retail prices. This resulted in a 16%
increase in 2020 second quarter sales over the prior period. (Marijuana Business Daily, 2020)

Keeping the retail price of legal products at or near that of the black market is necessary to shift
consumers purchasing behaviours towards legal channels where the product is subject to regulation and
oversight. To maintain the profitability of legally produced and distributed product it is important that
the government-imposed sales and excise taxes are kept relatively low. This impacts the revenue
generating capability of the taxes.

The Costs of Legalization
Legalization of recreational cannabis brought with it a change in costs borne between the Federal
Government, Provinces and Municipalities.

Currently the federal government shares 75% of excise tax revenues with the provinces. Erich Hartmann
argues that “the sharing of the revenues from the excise tax should be informed by the relative
cannabis-related costs each level of government carries”. (Hartmann, 2018) Prior to legalization,
Hartmann reviewed the estimated before and after costs associated with cannabis enforcement
between the three governing bodies to determine if the current revenue sharing model would continue
to reflect these costs in the future. He found that post legalization, some costs were anticipated to
increase while others would decline substantially.
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Municipalities would realize increased costs to update and enforce zoning and building codes, enforce
smoking restrictions, and advise in retail locations and business licensing. Additionally, local public
health units would incur costs associated with public education campaigns outlining the health risks of
cannabis use.

Hartmann identified that the largest cost decrease was forecasted in the criminal justice system.
Policing, court and corrections costs would all be likely to decline with municipalities being the primary
beneficiary of these cost savings. Hartmann found that prior to legalization, possession offences were
responsible for 60 percent of cannabis-related criminal justice costs. These savings would be partially
offset by anticipated increased costs related to a rise in cannabis-impaired driving offences.

While Hartmann’s research suggested municipal cost savings would be realized this has yet to
materialize. When cannabis was first legalized, the City of Edmonton estimated it would cost an
additional $4.3 million per year to cover the costs of police training and equipment, bylaw enforcement
and rezoning work required to allow cannabis retailers to operate. (CBC, 2018) Similarly, Regina
estimated that the additional policing costs following legalization would be between $1.2 and $1.8
million per year. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities calculated that the annual costs related to
cannabis legalization for municipalities to be between $3 million to $4.75 million per 500,000 residents.
This equates to $6 to $9.50 per resident. (Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 2019)

In the year following legalization, the City of Calgary incurred $10.3 million of additional costs yet
received just $3.84 million in one-time funding from the provincial Municipal Cannabis Transition
Program. (Huges, 2019) Similarly, the Union of B.C. Municipalities surveyed its members and found that
over three years (2018-2020) 34 British Columbia municipalities estimated they would incur an
additional $15.2 million in capital and operating costs with policing costs representing 33 percent of all
incremental costs. When extrapolated to all BC municipalities the figure rises to an average of $11.5
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million per year in incremental costs due to cannabis legalization. (Saltman, 2019) Unlike Alberta, B.C.
has not yet provided any transitional funding to municipalities to offset the increased costs.

The long-term financial impacts of cannabis legalization on municipalities remains unclear.
Municipalities consistently report policing costs as the largest incremental expenditure increase since
legalization. With the decriminalization of marijuana possession, criminal justice costs should decrease
over time. It is difficult to determine how other cannabis related offences will impact policing costs.

In the United States, researchers at Washington State University found that there was virtually no
statistically significant long-term effects of recreational marijuana legalization or retail sales on violent
or property crime rates in that state. However, police officials have reported a significant increase in
marijuana-related driving under the influence charges. (Decker & Smay, 2020) In Canada, the National
Cannabis Survey found that the reported likelihood of driving after cannabis use did not change
following legalization. (Rotermann, 2020). While the rate of cannabis impaired driving may not be
changing post legalization, the frequency of roadside impairment testing will likely increase as
municipalities strive to maintain public safety on local roadways. This leads to increased costs as oral
fluid testing devices used to detect the presence of THC cost between $20 to $40 each significantly
above the cost of disposable mouthpieces used on breathalyzers which cost several cents each. (Cullen,
2017)

Revenue Sharing in Other Jurisdictions
In the United States there are states where cannabis has been legalized and that share a portion of
taxation with the local level of governments, as well as, allow local sales taxes. Colorado and
Washington became the first states in the United States to legalize recreational cannabis in 2012. Their
taxation and revenue sharing frameworks are outlined below.

22

State of Colorado
Colorado has been collecting cannabis taxation revenues since 2014. While the largest portion of
revenues go to fund health care, health education and substance abuse programs, a portion is directed
to other government programs including public schools.

When first legalized, cannabis was subject to a recreational marijuana tax rate of 10%. This was
increased to 15% in 2017. Of the 15% special sales tax collected, 10% of revenues are distributed
directly to local governments. (Colorado Office of State Planning & Budgeting, 2019) In addition, the
product is subject to a 15% excise tax which is paid each time the product is transferred from a
production facility to a dispensary. It is also subject to a 2.9% state sales tax. Finally, it can be further
subjected to local taxes which vary depending on the district in which it is sold. For example, in Denver
an additional 1% sales tax is added which supports the Regional Transportation District and the Scientific
and Cultural Facilities District. In other areas of the state, these local taxes fund initiatives such as the
Aurora Day Centre, a place for the area’s homeless to spend the day. In Colorado there are no limits
placed on the taxes that can be levied locally. (Awad, 2018) At the state level revenues are used to
support a variety of programs including capital investments in public education facilities.

State of Washington
In Washington State, the excise tax is 37% which is paid by consumers at the time of purchase. In fiscal
year 2019, the State collected a total of $395.5 million in marijuana income and license fees. Of this
total, 98.7% came from the state’s excise or sales tax. State marijuana revenues exceeded those of
liquor by $172 million and grew by $28 million over the prior year. (Davidson, 2020) While these figures
appear high, marijuana-based taxes account for just 1.5% of all of State’s revenues. Of the nearly $400
million collected in 2019, 50% was used to assist under-insured low-income residents pay for healthcare,
31% was deposited in the State’s general fund, 13% was used to fund community healthcare centres and
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programs to reduce the drop-out rate, 3% funded education and research initiatives, leaving just 4% to
be distributed to cities and counties. (Decker & Smay, 2020)

Option 1 – Distribution of Cannabis Revenues to Municipalities
Under this proposed option, the Federal government would continue to collect the excise tax and retain
25% of proceeds to a maximum of $100 million a year while distributing the remaining 75% to the
Provinces and Territories. Of the total funding received by the Province of Ontario, 50% would then be
shared with local municipalities. The funding would be granted to municipalities under long-term
funding agreements, preferably 10 years or more, which would provide municipalities with longer term
financial certainty and security. The use of the funding would be unrestricted thereby allowing
municipalities to apply the annual grant to their area of greatest need. Those municipalities facing
increased enforcement and compliance costs could direct the funding to offset these increased
expenses while other municipalities may choose to apply the funding to address other needs such as
infrastructure.

The province would apply their 50% share of the funding to a number of areas such as those which
address any additional healthcare and social costs realized as a result of legalization. This may include
providing additional funding to public health units to increase public education and awareness
campaigns, substance abuse, and research programs.

Fairness
Taxation is considered fair when there is perceived equity in terms of the taxes paid by the residents and
businesses in comparison to the benefits they receive. In the case of the excise tax paid by producers
and incorporated into the final sale price of cannabis products there is little connection to spending on
municipal infrastructure needs. The industry is likely to support paying this excise tax to cover the
increased costs of regulating and monitoring the industry, especially as it relates to shifting consumers

24
away from the black market. Using the funds for other purposes, especially those as unrelated as
municipal infrastructure would face considerable resistance. In particular the industry would push back
against any increase in the existing excise tax as this would either erode profitability or drive the current
retail price even higher than illegal sources.

Immobile Tax Base
Under the current taxation framework in Canada, a licensed cannabis producer pays a federal excise
duty which is roughly $1 per gram when the cannabis products are delivered to a purchaser. This
purchaser may include a provincially-authorized distributor, a retailer or a final consumer. In Canada,
final consumers are responsible for paying the applicable GST/HST depending on the province or
territory where the product is purchased. In Ontario this would result in a 13% HST added to the final
sale price of the product. (Government of Canada, 2020) As the sales taxation framework is uniform
across the province and the excise tax is uniform across the country there is little incentive for
consumers to go outside the jurisdiction to avoid the charges.

While a consumer may have little incentive to leave the physical jurisdiction to avoid the tax, the ready
supply of illegal sources makes it relatively easy to avoid the taxation. Any increase to the current
taxation raises the final sale price of the product and provides further incentive for consumers to seek
out illicit sources.

Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues
While revenues fell far short of initial projections in the first year of legalization, the industry is growing.
This can be seen in the large number of stores now open across the country. Ontario has now opened
its 100th store and is projected to reach 150 total retail locations by the end of 2020. Cannabis 2.0
products generated $4.3 million in sales during the first month of legal sales in Ontario. The Federal
Government has estimated revenues in excess of $220 million by 2023. While these are large figures,
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they are far below the magnitude required to address the $2.25 billion annual infrastructure funding
deficit in Ontario. In addition, the government is reluctant to increase the excise tax any further as it will
raise the retail price of legal cannabis products even higher than illicit sources.

Visible, Transparent, and Accountable
The cannabis producer is responsible for paying the excise tax to the Federal Government. It then
becomes a part of the final consumer retail price which is then subjected to HST in Ontario. As the
excise tax forms part of the retail price of the product it lacks transparency to the final consumer.
Similar to the Federal and Provincial gas taxes, the end consumer makes little connection between the
retail price of fuel and the underlying taxes contributing to the end price.

Ease of Administration
The excise tax is currently collected by the Federal Government and then proportionately shared with
the Provinces and Territories. To further distribute this revenue to the municipalities, the Province of
Ontario would likely provide a grant program to local municipalities. There are a number of options of
how this money could be shared across the various municipalities. Some of these options may include
distribution based on population, number of retail cannabis locations or producers, reported
incremental enforcement costs, value of municipal infrastructure, or any combination of factors. While
the Province has many existing grant programs in place to transfer funding to municipalities, the largest
challenge will be in determining which funding allocation method provides the fairest distribution to the
local level. Determining a fair allocation method should be done in consultation with existing advocacy
organizations such as AMO.

Option 2 - 1% Increase in the Provincial Portion of the HST
For many years AMO has been lobbying the Government of Ontario for more diversified municipal
revenue tools. In recent years most of this lobbying has focused on a 1% municipal sales tax. This sales
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tax would be administered by adding 1% to the existing 8% provincial portion of the Harmonized Sales
Tax (HST) in Ontario. The Province of Ontario would then distribute the funding to local governments
using a predetermined formula.

This increase to the HST would help to manage the pressure on the property tax and fix the chronic
under-investment in municipal infrastructure in the province. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario,
2017). Based on AMO’s calculations a 1% sales tax would generate $2.7 billion annually less an
adjustment of 2% to reflect collection costs and $166.5 million in sales tax credits for residents with
incomes below the Low-Income Cut-off (LICO). This results in net annual proceeds of $2.47 billion for
municipalities in Ontario. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2017) By comparison, the Federal
Gas Tax provided $819.4 million in funding to Ontario municipalities in 2018/2019. (Government of
Canada, 2020)

While a local sales tax may be a relatively new idea in Canada there are many jurisdictions in the world
which permit it. In the United States there are currently 25 states which permit a local sales tax of at
least 1%. (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2017). These local sales taxes are generally referred
to as the “local option sales tax” but since the tax rate is often fixed and capped at one cent per dollar
subjected to tax it is more commonly known as the “penny tax”. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) In the United
States approximately 12% of all local government tax revenues come from a form of local sales tax.
(Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)

Fairness
Currently in Canada, urban population growth is occurring in suburb municipalities located just outside
of major anchor cities with the suburban residents relying upon the large cities for much of their major
infrastructure needs. While the growth just outside of the anchor city’s municipal boundaries may
stimulate the local economy, it does not translate into additional property tax revenues. (Vander Ploeg
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C. G., 2011) The implementation of a province-wide sales tax increase would help to ensure that those
coming into a city to use its services and infrastructure help to pay for a portion of it. This would result
in a stronger link between those who consume the service and those who pay for it.

In addition, unlike residential property tax which does not relate to ability to pay, or to business and
commercial property taxes which do not relate to profits, a sales tax targets consumption. This is a far
more appropriate proxy for ability to pay. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)

Immobile Tax Base
Sales taxes employed at the local level run the risk of producing economic distortions by shifting retail
sales activities and consumer behaviour from one region to another. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)
However, should the 1% sales tax be imposed at the provincial level as part of the HST, this impact
would be minimized.

In Canada sales tax rates vary across the country. Increasing Ontario’s current 13% HST to 14% would
not raise the rate to the highest level in Canada. Currently all provinces east of Ontario have rates a 15%
while those provinces west of Ontario are 13% or below.

The following table outlines the current applicable sales tax rates in Canada:
Province / Territory
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
Newfoundland and Labrador
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
British Columbia
Saskatchewan
Yukon
Nunavut
Northwest Territories
Alberta

Rate
15%
15%
15%
15%
14.975%
13%
13%
12%
11%
5%
5%
5%
5%
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Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues
Unlike the property tax, growth in sales tax revenue does not have to be achieved by increasing the
rates each year. A sales tax grows from increases in population and is tied to the performance of the
economy as a whole. It also captures the effects of inflation. A downturn in the economy will reduce
overall revenues while economic growth with increase it. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)

The addition of the 1% tax to the existing HST would provide for a very broad tax base. Unlike a
property tax which reflects only one aspect of the economy (real estate) a sale tax generates revenues
across a broad range of goods and services. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)

AMO has estimated the net annual revenue generated from this proposal at $2.47 billion which is
sufficient to fully fund the estimated $2.25 billion annual infrastructure investment shortfall.

Visible, Transparent, and Accountable
One way to ensure transparency is to earmark any form of new tax revenues specifically for
infrastructure. Earmarking refers to the practice of legislatively assigning revenue from a tax source to
funding a specific expenditure. By earmarking the funds towards local infrastructure it shields the
revenues from political pressures that might attempt to divert the revenue elsewhere and results in
increased accountability as there is a clear connection between the revenue and the expenditure.
(Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011) With the blending of the additional 1% into the existing HST any earmarking
of this funding would become less transparent to the taxpayer.

Ease of Administration
Under AMO’s proposal the 1% municipal sales tax would be added to the 8% provincial portion of the
HST. This would require consent from the Province but changes to the provincial rate does not require
Federal approval. Combining the tax within the existing HST eliminates the need to build and maintain
an independent tax infrastructure thus reducing administrative costs. (Vander Ploeg C. G., 2011)
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The federal government administratively collects the HST and distributes the provincial portion back to
each province based on their sales tax rates. Once the provincial government receives their distribution,
they could further distribute the 1% portion back to the municipalities with the assistance of AMO in a
similar fashion to the current distribution of gas taxes or other grant programs using a predetermined
funding formula. Determining a fair funding formula may be one of the greatest challenges and would
likely require the consultation of organizations such as AMO. Options for distribution may be based on
population, sales tax revenues by municipality, value of municipal infrastructure, or some combination
of a number of criteria. Further complications of calculating this funding formula would arise in two-tier
municipalities where the relative distribution of infrastructure need is not equally weighted between the
upper and lower tier governments.

While AMO has not recommended a final allocation method, they have calculated the effects of a per
household formula based on a sliding scale. For households located within a two-tier municipality, the
current share of upper tier revenue was used as the basis for sharing the revenues. AMO believes this
methodology reflects the service role that households (both permanent and seasonal) place on
municipal governments and acknowledges economies of scale for municipalities of different sizes. This
methodology would allocate 45% of revenues to municipalities within the Greater Toronto and Hamilton
Area (GTHA) and 55% to municipalities in the balance of the province. (Association of Municipalities of
Ontario, 2017)

Option 3 - Uploading of the Education Tax to Create Local
Property Tax Room
In Ontario, The Ministry of Education determines the total funding for each school board based on a
funding formula. A portion of the total funding comes from property taxes while the remainder comes
from the Province in the form of additional grants. Municipalities are responsible for collecting the
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education portion of property taxes for the school boards in their communities using a uniform rate set
by the Province based on a current value assessment system. In the 2019-20 fiscal year, municipalities
provided $7.2 billion of funding to school boards from the education property tax. (Financial
Accountability Office of Ontario, 2019) As both the province and the municipalities levy property taxes
there is a form of fiscal spillover effect that arises from this joint occupancy of the tax field. Higher
property taxes levied by one government has the effect of reducing the taxing capacity of the other
level. (Mintz & Roberts, 2006)

To meet the long-term infrastructure funding requirements identified by AMO, the Province would need
to shift $2.25 billion of the $7.2 billion of funding currently provided by the education property tax to
general funds. Local governments could then use the vacated tax space to increase their own property
taxes and earmark the increased funding to infrastructure. This change would have no direct impact to
final property tax bills but would provide municipalities with the funding needed to address the
infrastructure challenge. If the Province were to shift a total of $4.9 billion it would also allow
municipalities to maintain current service levels without the need for annual property tax increases for
the next 10 years.

This type of tax shift is not without precedent. Prior to 2007, municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area
(GTA) were required to “pool” tax assessment resources and redistribute the resulting revenues in a way
that recognized the additional social services costs borne by that city. Beginning in 2007, the Province
began to phase out the GTA pooling transfers and replace them instead with a provincial grant to
Toronto. (Fenn & Cote, 2015) Many municipalities that benefited from the resulting tax shift maintained
current property tax rates and used the newly created funding room to increase infrastructure
investment. In Halton Region alone this equated to an additional $41 million of annual infrastructure
investment of which 50% was shared with their lower tier municipalities. (Burlington Post, 2007)

31
As this option does not impose a new form of taxation the shifting $2.25 billion the education funding
away from property taxes would require the provincial government to fund this cost from other general
funds. To accomplish this the province would need to cut funding to other programs or continue to run
higher deficits.

Fairness
Property taxes have a long history in funding local government needs and traditionally have been well
supported for the purposes behind the tax. There is a strong connection between the services funded by
property taxes at the local level and property values. In this way the property tax is like a benefit tax as
it approximates the benefits received by properties from local services. Local residents who enjoy the
benefits from services are required to pay for them. (Slack, 2005) Residents feel they are receiving a
good value proposition in that the majority of services funded by property taxes increase the overall
value of their property. In this way property owners are paying for the very services that increase the
value of their properties. (Vander Ploeg C. , Problematic property tax: why the property tax fails to
measure up and what to do about it, 2008)

The challenge is that not all municipal services directly benefit properties equally. Strong connections
can be made between increased property values and a recently paved road, clean running water and a
nearby park. However, this connection weakens as property taxes are used to fund “people” services
such as community welfare systems, public health initiatives and recreational services as opposed to
“property” services.

Unfortunately, some infrastructure demands arise from people who do not contribute to the property
tax of the local municipality such as commuters, business travellers and tourists. As a result, property
owners bear the cost of infrastructure consumed by others.
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Immobile Tax Base
Because property tax is levied against real property it is largely immobile. It can not move location in
response to the tax. As such this makes it easy to collect. (Slack, 2005) However, real property can not
be considered completely immobile. While land is certainly immobile, improvements to the land and
personal property are less so. One must also consider that the people who own the property and are
responsible for paying the taxes are quite mobile. Rising property taxes in one location may encourage
the movement of people to lower taxed areas. This is particularly the case in city-regions that are highly
fragmented – places surrounded by other municipalities that may offer similar services at a lower tax
point. In such cases the tax base remains but the people paying the taxes leave. (Vander Ploeg C. ,
Problematic property tax: why the property tax fails to measure up and what to do about it, 2008)
While the property tax base may be considered immobile in the short-term, this becomes less so over
the medium to long-term.

Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues
As the property tax is a relatively broad-based tax, it has the ability of generating significant revenue
while employing relatively low tax rates. Property taxes and property related taxes currently generate
over 60% of own-source revenue and over 50% of total revenue of Canadian Municipalities. (Dahlby &
McMillan, 2014) However, the property tax often does not meet the needs of municipalities that have
high infrastructure needs but relatively low property tax bases as can be found in many rural and
Northern Ontario communities.

Property tax is also an inelastic source of revenue in that it does not increase automatically and
proportionately in response to economic growth. Moreover, the need for infrastructure is often tied to
economic and population growth while the property tax increases only marginally with growth. (Vander
Ploeg C. , No time to be timid: Addressing infrastructure deficits in the Western Big Six, 2004)
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Infrastructure required for a growing municipality is often required in advance of when the property tax
revenues are generated from that growth. This can be problematic for municipal cashflows.

Visible, Transparent, and Accountable
Unlike income taxes which are withheld at source, the property tax is highly visible. This visibility makes
local governments accountable but also makes it difficult to increase the tax rate without residential
pushback. (Slack, 2005) Since municipalities are not permitted to budget a deficit, determining the
property tax rate is often the last step in municipal budgeting. The property tax levy and resulting tax
rate must make up the residual between planned expenditures and planned other sources of revenues
such as user fees and grants. As a result, it changes annually. In contrast, federal and provincial
governments set their tax rates such as those for personal and corporate income and sales taxes and
change them infrequently. (Dahlby & McMillan, 2014)

Ease of Administration
Local property taxes are often more costly to administer than other potential forms of local taxation
such as income, sales and fuel taxes which could be piggy-backed onto existing provincial taxes. (Kitchen
& Slack, 2016) However, municipalities already have the levying and collection mechanisms in place so
shifting the proportionate collection of taxes between local and education rates would not have a longterm impact to administrative costs.

Comparing the Results
The following section will compare each of the funding options against the evaluation criteria.

Fairness
A tax can be considered fair when there is a sense of equity between taxes paid in comparison to the
benefits received. In so far as funding hard infrastructure is concerned, there is a strong connection
between the taxes paid and the perceived or realized increase in property values.
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While property taxes can be criticized for being unfair in that they do not reflect an individual’s ability to
pay, a sales tax targets consumption. In this way a sales tax is a far more appropriate proxy for ability to
pay.

The excise tax paid by cannabis producers and incorporated into the final sale price of cannabis products
has little connection to spending on municipal infrastructure needs. Using this funding for such a
disconnected service would be met with considerable resistance. There would be far greater industry
support for using the excise tax revenues to fund the increased costs associated with legalization and
initiatives to eliminate the cannabis black market.

Immobile Tax Base
In the short-term property taxes have a very immobile tax base. However, over time there is a
possibility that residents may move away from areas of higher taxation to municipalities offering similar
services at a lower cost.

As the 1% HST would be administered at the provincial level there is little incentive to shift consumer
behaviour in response to the increase in the tax rate. Provinces to the east of Ontario would still have a
higher sales tax rate (15% vs 14%) and Manitoba to the west would be only marginally below (13% vs
14%). This 1% savings would not contribute to significant cross-border shopping patterns especially
considering the remoteness and size of communities along the Ontario/Manitoba border.

The cannabis excise taxes are administered on a Federal level and therefore have an immobile tax base.
However, any increases to the excise tax rate would increase the final sales price of the end product and
drive consumer behaviour towards the black market.
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Sufficient, Stable, and Predictable Revenues
The revenue generating capabilities from cannabis revenues fall far short of the level of funding required
to address the infrastructure funding gap, regardless of the percentage shared with local municipalities.
In addition, there is little incentive to increase the excise tax rate as this would drive consumers towards
illicit sources of cannabis products.
Both the sales tax and property tax shift have the potential to generate sufficient funding to address the
$2.25 billion infrastructure funding deficit identified by AMO. However, regions with high infrastructure
needs and low property tax bases may be challenged to raise the funds from property taxes alone. In
this way, the sales tax offers redistributive powers not available to the property tax.
The effectiveness of this redistributive power would be subject to how the end funding formula is
developed by the Province. In the sample household-based allocation methodology calculated by AMO,
45% of sales tax revenues would be provided to GTHA municipalities with 55% provided to the balance
of municipalities in the province. Many other methodologies are possible, each with their own ability to
redistribute the revenues across the province.
Finally, unlike the property tax, growth in sales tax revenue does not have to be achieved by increasing
the rates each year. A sales tax grows from increases in population and is tied to the performance of the
economy as a whole.

Visible, Transparent, and Accountable
The regular requirement to change the property tax rate make it by far the most visible, transparent and
accountable of the proposed funding tools. This visibility improves accountability which helps residents
relate the services that they receive to the costs of the taxes that they pay. (Mintz & Roberts, 2006) At
the same time this visibility is a key reason why Councils are reluctant to increase the rate to the degree
required to fund the infrastructure need. By shifting the cost of education off the property tax base,
Councils could achieve the level of funding required without having to raise the overall property tax
burden.
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The 1% sales tax is visible to the taxpayer as it is added on top of the final sale price of purchased goods.
However, earmarking 1% of the sales tax to municipal infrastructure needs would become less
transparent over time as the value is blended into the total tax rate.

The cannabis excise tax is the least visible of the options to the end taxpayer. As this taxation is paid by
cannabis producers it forms a part of the sales price of the final product. In this way it is similar to fuel
taxes in that many final consumers fail to realize how much the tax contributes to the retail price of the
product.

Ease of Administration
Unlike the other two options presented, increasing local property tax rates would not require the
Province to develop what has the potential of being a highly contentious funding formula to distribute
either the sales tax or cannabis grants to the local level. As such this option is likely to be the easiest to
implement and would not result in additional long-term administrative costs.

Summary
The following table summarized how the funding options address the evaluation criteria. A checkmark
indicates the criteria is partially met while two checkmarks indicate the criteria is largely met.

Criteria
Fairness
Immobile Tax Base
Sufficient, Stable,
Predictable Revenues
Visible, Transparent,
Accountable
Ease of Administration

Cannabis Taxes

1% Sales Tax

Education Upload

37
Cannabis taxes lack transparency, have little connection to municipal infrastructure needs and generate
insufficient revenues to address the infrastructure funding deficit. There is also the potential for
consumers to shift purchases to the black market in response to any increase in the excise tax paid as
part of the retail sales price of cannabis products.
The 1% sales tax generates sufficient revenues to address the issue and has a broad tax base. The
revenues would increase as the economy grows. While the public would resist any increase to the HST,
the resulting 14% sales tax rate would remain below the highest rates charged in Canada. This option
has a high redistribution ability to areas of the province with the greatest need.
Of all of the options presented, property tax has the highest connection to infrastructure and is the most
transparent. As such taxpayers will view it as fair. Unfortunately, the property tax does not address two
key issues. Firstly, it does not solve the spillover effects of non-residents using local services. Secondly,
it is raised locally so does not have the same redistribution potential as a province wide sale tax. This
option generates sufficient revenues to address the problem but would require the province to find
alternative sources from which to fund education.

Recommendation
The aim of this research was to evaluate which of the three proposed revenue tools was best suited to
address the municipal infrastructure funding deficit in Ontario. After evaluating the three options
against a common set of evaluation criteria it is recommended that the provincial portion of the HST in
Ontario be increased by 1%. The estimated $2.47 billion of additional revenues generated from this
increase should then be redistributed to local governments as a new source of funding to address
infrastructure challenges.

This option provides a new diversified funding source for municipalities and has an ability to redistribute
the revenues across the province to the municipalities with the greatest infrastructure funding
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challenges. This redistribution power is not possible with property tax based revenues and the cannabis
excise taxes are insufficient to meet the infrastructure needs.

Conclusion
Municipalities in Canada require additional revenue sources if they are to make meaningful progress on
addressing the infrastructure funding deficit.

No single tax is a perfect solution. None are entirely fair or neutral with regards to investment patterns
or economic distortions. At the same time, no single tax is equally suited to generate predictable, stable
and growing revenue streams. A single tax source can not perfectly compensate for inflation, local
economy growth, or free-riding that results from non-residents using local infrastructure. (Vander Ploeg
C. G., 2011) The infrastructure challenge facing municipalities in Ontario has arisen from a large number
of challenges and will require a large number of solutions if it is to be adequately addressed. There is no
silver bullet.

Diversifying revenues with the introduction of a sales tax dedicated to municipal infrastructure needs is
the option best suited to addressing the infrastructure funding deficit in Ontario.
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